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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the government has escalated its "war on
drugs." Although the "war" has not decreased drug use or limited the
availability of drugs on the street, the government continues to sacrifice
the constitutional rights of its citizens in an effort to escalate the
hostility. Since the "zero tolerance" policy of the Reagan Administration, the government has relied heavily on the forfeiture of property
related to drug crimes as a tool to deter and punish the illegal
distribution of drugs. The federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881,
allows the government to seize any property used to facilitate a drug
offense.1 Such property may include the real property where a drug
deal takes place or vehicles used to travel to a location where a deal is
consummated. 2
Because the forfeiture statute is classified as "civil," rather than
"criminal," the government need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.' Rather, it need only demonstrate probable cause to
believe the property was connected to a drug offense to shift the
burden of demonstrating innocence to the property owner.4 In the
forfeiture action, the property owner is not entitled to a court
appointed attorney,' and it is unclear whether she has the right to a
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1. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4), (7) (West Supp. 1995).
2. See id. § 881(a)(7) (real property); § 881(a)(4) (vehicles and other conveyances).
3. United States v. One 1977 Pontiac Grand Prix, 483 F. Supp. 48, 49 (N.D. III. 1979).
4. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
5. See United States v. Doe, 743 F.2d 1033, 1038 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that "only
offenses where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed give the defendant a right to appointed
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Further, because such forfeitures are tied to the commission of

a crime, the property owner is often incarcerated while the forfeiture
action is pending. Thus, he must often choose between spending
limited resources on defending the criminal action and attempting to
save his property.
Civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution have been called "doubleedged weapons," and until very recently, the government could wield
these weapons "with virtual impunity."7 As one writer commented,
before the relatively recent recognition of the constitutional problems
engendered by parallel civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution based
upon the same conduct,
[u]nrestrained prosecutors began to act like children without adult
supervision, using these "nuclear weapons" in tandem to impoverish
and then incarcerate defendants in record numbers, and with
draconian sentences....
It was like shooting fish in a barrel for prosecutors. Sometimes
they would pursue civil forfeiture first under the lesser standard of
proof required in a civil action and then seek conviction in a
subsequent proceeding. This gave them a "dry run" at the trial,
and put the defendant at a serious disadvantage, having to fight two
fronts at once.'

decisions
Over the past several years, however, a number of appellate
9
have dramatically blunted these double-edged weapons.
These decisions include a trio of Supreme Court cases: United
States v. Halper,'0 Austin v. United States," and Department of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch." These cases lead to the

counsel"). But see Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d 736, 746 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1994) (concluding that the complainant contesting forfeiture action was constitutionally
entitled to court appointed counsel because substantial private property interests and the Excessive
Fines Clause were involved).
6. See United States v. RR #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 876 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
"uncertainty of the law" as to whether forfeiture claimant has a right to trial by jury). But see
Idaho Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Lot 2 in Block 5 of Vista Village Addition, 885 P.2d 381,
386 (Idaho 1994) (concluding that the Idaho Constitutiongrants the right to a jury trial in an in
rem forfeiture proceeding).
7. See United States v. Stanwood. 872 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D. Or. 1994).
8. BRENDA GRANTLAND ET AL., FORFEITURE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY: How TO TURN
PROSECUTORIAL OVERREACHING INTO RELEASE OF PRISONERS OR RETURN OF SEIZED
PROPERTY 5 (published by FEAR Foundation, 1994).
9. See infra note 24.
10. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
12. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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inescapable conclusion that the civil forfeiture of crime-related property
is punitive and such forfeitures can often violate the Double Jeopardy
13
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Despite the clear message of these Supreme Court cases, several
lower federal courts and many state appellate courts have been
reluctant to give meaningful effect to this newly understood constitutional protection. This Article will explain why parallel civil forfeiture
and criminal prosecution, when based upon the same criminal
conduct, violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. Further, it will
explore how courts that have avoided this conclusion have misread and
misapplied controlling precedent.
In their efforts to avoid granting relief to a culpable defendant
when confronted with a clear violation of the prohibition against
double jeopardy, many courts have relied on twisted reasoning or
absurd legal fictions in the face of contrary Supreme Court precedent.
As late as 1993, the argument that the government could not punish
a person with incarceration and also forfeit his or her property without
running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause was met with scorn, and
attorneys making this argument were occasionally ridiculed.14
Perhaps because of the persistent reluctance of the lower courts to
give meaningful effect to the prohibition against double jeopardy, the
Supreme Court has addressed the forfeiture-punishment issue
repeatedly in recent years, making it clear that the double jeopardy
concerns created by parallel civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution
must be taken seriously.
In 1994, many appellate courts began to give effect to these
Supreme Court pronouncements and to dismiss criminal cases or return
forfeited property to remedy apparent violations. Although the
realization of the constitutional dilemma has been gradual, it is
undeniable. As illustrated below, those courts that have refused to
recognize the double jeopardy dilemma have been able to do so only
by ignoring relevant precedent, as well as common sense.
II. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no person "shall ...be subject for the same offense to be twice

13. See discussion infra part III.A.
14. This writer, after making the argument in King County Superior Court in 1993, was
told by the court that it was a nice argument but one with "absolutely no chance of success."
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put in jeopardy of life or limb."'" This guarantee against double
jeopardy is "one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization," 6
and is considered "fundamental" to the Anglo-American system of
justice. 7 The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The guarantee against double jeopardy protects individuals from
three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.' 9 In
the context of civil forfeitures, the third protection is of paramount
concern: protection from multiple punishments for the same offense.2 o

III.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE CIVIL FORFEITURE CONTEXT

Many courts have recognized that civil forfeitures arising from
In
criminal conduct present serious double jeopardy concerns.'
addressing the double jeopardy implications of these crime-related
forfeitures, one must ask three primary questions: (1) Do both the
criminal conviction and the forfeiture of crime-related property
constitute "punishment"?; (2) Were the two punishments imposed for
(3) Were the two punishments imposed in
the "same offense"?; and
"separate proceedings"? 22 Relying primarily on the Halper-AustinKurth Ranch rule that civil forfeitures are punitive, 23 many courts
have answered these questions in the affirmative.2 4 Other courts,

15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Most state constitutions have similar provisions. See, e.g.,
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing that "no person shall be ...twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense"); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing that "no person shall be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense").
dissenting).
16. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J.,
17. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
18. Id. at 794.
19. E.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 823 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Johnson
v. State, 882 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
21. See infra notes 24-25.
22. E.g., United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp.
817, 823 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
23. See supra text accompanying note 13 and discussion infra part III.A.
24. See, e.g., Ursety, 59 F.3d at 573-76 (finding that the civil forfeiture constituted
punishment, that the forfeiture and criminal conviction were punishment for the same offense,
and that the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution were two separate proceedings such that the
criminal conviction was barred by double jeopardy); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,
33 F.3d 1210, 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a civil forfeiture action instituted in a
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demonstrating a profound (and occasionally profane) reluctance to
dismiss criminal convictions or overturn large forfeiture judgments
where guilt has been proven or conceded, have found various ways to
avoid granting the relief required under a fair reading of the Supreme
Court precedents.2 5 If the Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch rule is given
full effect, it is apparent that (1) the forfeiture of crime-related property
is punitive;26 (2) in many cases, the forfeiture and the criminal

separate proceeding and decided over a year after the criminal trial constituted punishment and,
thus, was barred by double jeopardy), amended on denial of reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); United States v.
Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 527 (D. Or. 1995) (finding criminal charges of conspiracy barred by
double jeopardy because prior civil forfeiture of property was based on conspiracy statutes);
United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that a
defendant was subjected to double jeopardy when a criminal conviction and sentence were
imposed in a separate proceeding months after forfeiture of the defendant's property for the same
offense); People v. Towns, 646 N.E.2d 1366, 1371 (I11.App. Ct. 1995) (finding that forfeiture
proceedings under the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act constitute punishment and
that forfeiture imposed in a separate proceeding from a criminal proceeding under the Act is
barred by double jeopardy); Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that the double jeopardy clause prohibited punishment for criminal conduct when the defendant
had already been punished in a civil forfeiture proceeding).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1219 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the
defendant was not placed in risk of jeopardy because he never became a party to the forfeiture
proceeding), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding that the defendant could not vacate his criminal conviction because he plead guilty
to the criminal charges before the forfeiture proceedings were completed); United States v. Torres,
28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.) (finding that jeopardy did not attach in the forfeiture proceeding
because the defendant did not become a party to that proceeding), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994); United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the civil
forfeiture of a defendant's home used for an illegal gambling operation was not barred by double
jeopardy, even though the defendant had previously been punished by a criminal conviction for
the same gambling offense); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
double jeopardy was not implicated because the criminal and civil forfeiture actions were part of
a single proceeding, despite the fact that the actions were filed separately with their own docket
numbers), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); United States v. Nakamoto, 876 F. Supp. 235, 23839 (D. Haw.) (finding no double jeopardy where the defendant voluntarily chose not to contest
the civil forfeiture and was not a party to that proceeding), affd, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert.filed, (U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 95-7313); United States v. Walsh, 873 F. Supp.
334, 337 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that the defendant waived his right to assert double jeopardy
because he elected not to be a party to the civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Stanwood,
872 F. Supp. 791, 800 (D. Or. 1994) (finding that the defendant was not entitled to have his
conviction vacated because jeopardy attached in the defendant's criminal case before it attached
in the civil forfeiture action); Crowder v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 703 (M.D.N.C. 1994)
(finding that double jeopardy was not implicated when the defendant was convicted of conspiracy,
while the property was forfeited for its connection to the underlying substantive crime); United
States v. Kemmish, 869 F. Supp. 803, 806 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the defendant was not
placed in jeopardy in the administrative forfeiture proceeding because he made no claim to the
property and was therefore not a party to the proceeding).
26. See discussion infra part III.A.
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prosecution are based on the same offense; 27 and (3) the civil forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution are separate proceedings.28
As a result, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of both
civil forfeiture and criminal conviction.29
A. Is the Forfeiture of Crime-Related Property "Punitive" for
Purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause?
1. General Considerations
In United States v. Halper,30 the Supreme Court held that a civil
penalty imposed by the government can constitute "punishment" for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 1 Halper was convicted of
sixty-five counts of violating the criminal False Claims Act32 for filing
sixty-five fraudulent claims for Medicare reimbursement.3 3 He was
sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. 34 Following
Halper's conviction, the Government brought an action under the civil
False Claims Act,3" seeking a $2,000 civil penalty for each of the
sixty-five separate violations.36 The district court concluded "that in
light of Halper's previous criminal punishment," a civil penalty of
$130,000 would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the
penalty was "entirely unrelated" and bore "no rational relation" to the
actual damages suffered or expenses incurred by the Government.3 7
Accordingly, the district court held that the fine was a second
punishment for the same offense,3" declared the civil False Claims
Act unconstitutional as applied to Halper, 39 and limited the Government's recovery to $1,170, the amount of actual damages.4"
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court
that a civil sanction imposed by the government can constitute
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.41 In so

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See discussion infra part III.B.
See discussion infra part III.C.
See discussion infra part VI.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Id. at 448-49.
18 U.S.C.A. § 287 (West Supp. 1995).
Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.

Id.

31 U.S.C.A. §§3729-3731 (West Supp. 1995).
36. Halper,490 U.S. at 438.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

at 438-39.
at 439.
at 440.
at 448-49.
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holding, the Court rejected the notion that a sanction is not punitive
merely because it is imposed in a civil rather than a criminal proceeding. Noting that "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount
importance,"42 the Court found that the determination of whether a
given civil sanction constitutes punishment requires an inquiry into
legislative intent.43 If the legislature intended the statute to deter or
punish illegal conduct, it is a punitive statute: "Simply put, a civil...
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment."" Following this
reasoning, the Court held that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the term."4 5 This rule
is the most significant aspect of the Halpercase: A civil sanction must
be solely remedial in order to escape classification as punishment.46
If the sanction can be understood as at least partially deterrent or
retributive, it constitutes punishment.4 7 Such punitive penalties,
imposed after criminal conviction, 48 run afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.49
Although Halper did not address the double jeopardy implications
of civil in rem forfeitures, the Court's method for determining whether
a civil proceeding is punitive also applies in the forfeiture context.
Thus, in Austin v. United States, ° the Court relied on Halper in
holding that crime-related civil forfeitures pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881
are punitive and therefore subject to review under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."1

42. Id. at 447.
43. See id. at 447 & n.7.
44. Id. at 448; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362
(1984) (stating that the underlying question in determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to a particular type of proceeding is "whether [the] proceeding is intended to be, or by its
nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial").
45. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 448-49.
48. The order in which the punishments are imposed is irrelevant. Whether criminal
prosecution precedes civil in rem forfeiture or vice versa, the second punishment violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992). The reason for this is simple: The Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the imposition of multiple punishments. Thus, the remedy for violation of the clause
is relief from the second punishment-whether that happens to be imprisonment or property
forfeiture.
49. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
50. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
51. Id. at 2812.
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In Austin, the defendant was convicted and sentenced in state
court following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.5 2 Following conviction, the United States filed an in rem
action in federal district court seeking forfeiture of the defendant's
mobile home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7). 53 The Government alleged that this property was used to
facilitate the drug offense. 4 The district court rejected Austin's
argument that forfeiture of the property would violate the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 5 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the Government that the Eighth
rem forfeitures. 56 The Supreme
Amendment does not apply to civil in
57
Court accepted review and reversed.
Citing Halper, the Court noted that "the question is not, as the
United States would have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.""
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court reiterated the
holding in Halper that a statute which is not wholly remedial must be
"We need not exclude the possibility that a
deemed punitive:
purposes to conclude that it is subject to the
serves
remedial
forfeiture
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must
determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish." 9
After a careful review of the history of in rem forfeiture, the Court
concluded that forfeiture, particularly statutory in rem forfeiture, has
historically "been understood, at least in part, as punishment."6 ° The
Court then turned to a specific examination of the drug-related
forfeitures authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). The Court found

52. Id. at 2803.
53. Id. Section 881(aX4) subjects the following to forfeiture: "All conveyances, including
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled
substances] .... " 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995). Section 881(a)(7) provides for
the forfeiture of the following: "All real property, including any right, title, and interest
(including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment .... " Id. § 881(a)(7).
54. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
55. Id.

56. See id.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2812.
2806 & n.6.
2806.
2810.
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"nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the
historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment."6 1
The Court also found evidence of punitive legislative intent from
the presence of an "innocent owner" defense in the forfeiture provisions62 and noted that "these [innocent owner] exemptions serve to
focus the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that
makes them look more like punishment, not less" because they reveal
a congressional intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking. 63 Furthermore, the punitive nature of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) is
evident from the legislative history behind the statute64 and because
forfeiture is directly connected to the commission of a drug offense.65
In reaching the conclusion that the federal drug forfeiture statute
is not solely remedial and, therefore, must be considered punitive, the
Court focused on the clear congressional motivation for enacting the
drug forfeiture statute: to "deter and punish" illegal drug dealing.66
The Court's conclusion that deterrence and punishment are punitive
goals, rather than remedial goals, is undeniable. Likewise, the Court's
ultimate conclusion that the federal drug forfeiture statute does not
serve a solely remedial purpose and is, therefore, punitive and subject
to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause67 clearly follows. Although the Austin court did not address
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court's opinion left no serious doubt
that crime-related in rem forfeitures are punitive.
One year after Austin, in Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch,6" the Court addressed the question of whether a tax
imposed on illegally-possessed marijuana constitutes punishment for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.69 In Kurth Ranch, the
defendants plead guilty in state court to possessing marijuana with
intent to sell.7" After conviction and sentencing, the state sought to
collect a tax imposed on the illegally possessed marijuana.71 A federal
bankruptcy court ruled that imposition of the tax in a separate
proceeding following the criminal convictions violated the Double

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(7) (West Supp. 1995).
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
Id. at 2811.
Id.
See id. at 2812.
Id.
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
Id. at 1941.
Id. at 1942.
Id. at 1942-43.
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Jeopardy Clause.12 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
ruling, as did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.73 Because the
Ninth Circuit's ruling was in apparent conflict with a ruling by the
Montana Supreme Court, 74 the United States Supreme Court accepted
75
review.
Noting the "unusual features" of the Montana tax, the Court held
that imposition of the tax was punitive because it was "conditioned on
the commission of a crime."76 The Court found this fact to be
"significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering
of revenue. '7 7 The Court noted that in previous cases it had relied
"on the absence of such a condition to support its conclusion that a
particular federal tax was a civil rather than a criminal sanction."7
Finally, the Court found it significant that "the tax assessment not
only hinges on the commission of a crime, it also is exacted only after
conduct that gives rise
the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise
79
place."
first
the
in
obligation
tax
to the
Because the tax was so closely tied to the criminal culpability of
the taxpayer, the Court concluded that "(t]his tax, imposed on
criminals and no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as to
Because the tax was punitive, it
become a form of punishment. '
could not constitutionally be imposed in a separate proceeding
following criminal prosecution. The Court held that "this drug tax is
not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first punishment
of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a second punishment . . . and
therefore must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at
all."" 1
The lesson of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch is clear: A
nominally civil sanction, an in rem forfeiture, or a tax, is punitive
unless it serves a solely remedial purpose. A sanction that, even in
part, serves the punitive goals of deterrence or retribution is punishment and, thus, is subject to the provisions of the Double Jeopardy

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 1943.
Id.
See Sorensen v. State Dep't of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944.
Id. at 1947-48.
Id. at 1947 (quoting United States v, Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
Id. at 1947 & n.20.
Id. at 1947.
Id. at 1948.
Id.
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 2
The lower federal courts that have considered the question since
Kurth Ranch have, almost without exception, recognized that the
forfeiture of property used to facilitate a drug offense is punitive.8 3
In states having forfeiture provisions nearly identical to the federal
forfeiture statute, courts have held the state statutes punitive and
subjected such proceedings to double jeopardy analysis.8 4

Similar

forfeiture provisions linked to other criminal activity have also been
determined punitive.8 "
Some state courts have attempted to distinguish the Halper-AustinKurth Ranch rule on the basis of textual differences between state and
federal forfeiture statutes ." For example, in In re 2120 S. 4th
82. Although the Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch decisions dearly establish that in rein
forfeiture is punitive, the question of whether a claimant is entitled to the full panoply of criminal
protections in a forfeiture proceeding remains open. Compare United States v. $94,000.00 in
United States Currency, 2 F.3d 778, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that "the penalty of civil
forfeiture, while sufficiently akin to the criminal law to invoke ... the strictures of the Eighth
Amendment, does not convert a civil forfeiture proceeding into a criminal matter insofar as the
allocation of the burden of proof is concerned.") with Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency,
637 A.2d 736, 746 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (concluding that the complainant contesting forfeiture
action was constitutionally entitled to court appointed counsel because substantial private property
interests and the Excessive Fines Clause were involved) and Idaho Dep't of Law Enforcement v.
Lot 2 in Block 5 of Vista Village Addition, 885 P.2d 381, 386 (Idaho 1994) (concluding that the
Idaho Constitution grants the right to a jury trial in an in rem forfeiture proceeding).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 909 (1996); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F.
Supp. 791, 796 (D. Or. 1994); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 826 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding that in light of Austin the court had "no choice" but to conclude that civil forfeiture
constitutes punishment); United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (W.D. Wash.
1994); see also cases cited supra note 24.
84. See, e.g., People v. Towns, 646 N.E.2d 1366, 1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding the
Illinois Forfeiture Act punitive under federal double jeopardy analysis); Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d
830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding Texas forfeiture law punitive under Austin analysis,
thereby invoking double jeopardy protection); State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 97-98, 875 P.2d
613, 616 (1994) (finding that drug-crime-related forfeitures are "punishment" for purposes of
federal Double Jeopardy Clause analysis); Lot 2 in Block 5 of Vista Village Addition, 885 P.2d at
383 (holding Idaho forfeiture law punitive under Austin and therefore subject to Eighth
Amendment excessive fines analysis); see also State v. 392 South 600 E., 886 P.2d 534, 540-41
(Utah 1994) (holding Utah forfeiture statute punitive and subject to an Eighth Amendment
excessive fines analysis).
85. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that forfeiture statutes imposed on those convicted of illegal gambling were punitive);
United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 786, 790 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that forfeiture of home used
for illegal gambling was sufficiently punitive to implicate the Eighth Amendment).
86. See In re 2120 S. 4th Ave., 870 P.2d 417, 421 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
Arizona drug forfeiture statute is remedial and therefore not subject to excessive fines analysis);
State ex. rel. McGehee v. 1989 Ford F-150, 888 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (stating
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Avenue,8 7 an Arizona court relied on the legislative pronouncement
that a forfeiture provision "is remedial and not punitive" to find that
forfeiture under the state's racketeering statute is solely remedial within
the context of the Excessive Fines Clause. 8 However, because the
forfeiture statute has other punitive characteristics, 9 under Halper,
the Arizona Legislature cannot simply avoid double jeopardy scrutiny
by declaring the forfeiture provision remedial. As the Halper court
noted, such labels "are not of paramount importance" in determining
whether a given sanction is punitive. 90 Moreover, "the constitutionally 'impermissible' cannot be made into the 'permissible' even by a clear
expression of Congressional intent to permit it." 91 Thus, the Arizona
court's transparent attempt, in In re 2120 S.4th Avenue, to distinguish
the Arizona forfeiture statute may be subject to attack in federal court.
Other courts have maintained the remedial fiction by ignoring the
plain holding of Austin.9 2 In Ward v. State,93 a Texas court declared
the Texas forfeiture statute remedial, reasoning that "forfeited funds
and funds derived from the sale of forfeited property [are to] be used
for law enforcement purposes, and drug abuse and chemical dependency treatment programs."9' 4 According to the court, "[t]hese goals are
clearly remedial in nature."95 This approach is incorrect, as the same
court recognized five months later in Johnson v. State:96 "While we
believe the purpose of the statute is remedial, we acknowledge it may
not be solely remedial. If the forfeiture does not solely serve a
remedial purpose, but also serves as a retributive or deterrent purpose,
it is punishment."9' 7
The Johnson court's holding on this point indicates a reluctant, but
inevitable, acceptance of the Halper rule: If a statute is even partially

that the provisions of the Oklahoma controlled substances forfeiture statutes are primarily

remedial in nature).
87. 870 P.2d 417 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

88. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(N) (1989)).
89. For example, forfeiture under the Arizona racketeering statute is dependent upon the
commission of a crime, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(G) (Supp. 1995), and the statute
provides an "innocent owner" defense. See id. § 13-2314(F).
90.

490 U.S. at 447.

91. United States v. Smith, 874 F. Supp. 347, 349 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (interpreting Halper
and its progeny).
92. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 276-77, 906 P.2d 925, 934 (1995); see also
Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 567 (1994).
93. 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S.Ct. 567 (1994).
94. Id. at 663 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.06(c), (h) (West Supp. 1993)).
95. id.
96. 882 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
97. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
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motivated by punitive objectives, it is punitive. Despite the textual
support for the argument that crime-related forfeitures are remedial, it
is now widely apparent that such statutes are not solely remedial;
therefore, they must be declared punitive under the Halper-AustinKurth Ranch rule.
The determination of double jeopardy in the forfeiture context has
evolved beyond the preliminary issue of whether forfeiture statutes are
punitive. As it is now virtually undisputed that drug-related forfeitures are punitive, many courts have found other ways to avoid true
resolution of the double jeopardy concerns created by parallel civil
forfeiture and criminal prosecution. Some courts have attempted to
distinguish between forfeitures of property used to facilitate drug
crimes and forfeitures of property constituting proceeds of a drug
offense to avoid granting full relief to a culpable claimant or defendant.
This distinction is fallacious.
2.

"Proceeds" Versus "Facilitation" Forfeitures

While Austin and the cases cited above lead to the unavoidable
conclusion that the forfeiture of property used to facilitate a drug
offense is punitive, many courts have attempted to distinguish the
forfeiture of proceeds derived from drug distribution activities.9"
While the distinction between the forfeiture of proceeds pursuant to 21
U.S.C § 881(a)(6)99 and the forfeiture of property used to facilitate a
drug offense pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)' may provide a
convenient line in the sand for courts unwilling to reverse criminal
convictions or overturn large forfeiture judgments, the distinction is
conceptually unsound. As one court recognized, the argument that the
forfeiture of proceeds does not constitute punishment "not only

98. United States v. Twenty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two Dollars in U.S.
Currency, 47 F.3d 972, 973 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the forfeiture of drug-trafficking
proceeds does not constitute punishment); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.)
(holding that civil forfeiture of proceeds from the sale of drugs was not punishment because it was
solely remedial in nature), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573-74 (1994); United States v. Borromeo, 1
F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that where forfeiture is proportional to remedial purpose,
the forfeiture is not punitive); United States v. $288,930.00 in U.S. Currency, 838 F. Supp. 367,
370 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that forfeiture of narcotics distribution proceeds is not punishment
because claimant does not rightfully own the forfeited property).
99. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) (West 1981) subjects the following to forfeiture:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in
violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of this subchapter ....
100. See supra note 53.
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misconceives the legal standard established in Austin, but also misstates
the scope of the statutes involved."' 0 '
Courts holding that the forfeiture of illegal narcotics proceeds is
not punitive have often reasoned that, since the claimant had no lawful
right to the proceeds of his illegal activity, the deprivation of those
proceeds is not punitive.0 2 For example, in United States v.
Tilley, 0 3 the Fifth Circuit held that the forfeiture of proceeds from
illegal activity was not punishment because the defendant had no
property interest in the proceeds of illegal activity:"
[I]nstead of punishing the forfeiting party, the forfeiture of illegal
proceeds, much like the confiscation of stolen money from a bank
robber, merely places that party in the lawfully protected financial
status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme.
This is not punishment "within (sic] the plain meaning of the
word."105
The Tilley court's reasoning is an excellent example of a court
ignoring precedent and logic to avoid granting relief. Under Austin, all
drug-related forfeitures pursuant to section 881(a) are punitive, as a
matter of law, because the purpose of the statute is to deter and punish
narcotics offenses. 0 6 The loss of property pursuant to a punitive
statute is punishment within the plain meaning of the word. Moreover, the proceeds forfeiture provision is part of the same statutory
forfeiture scheme that was deemed punitive in Austin: "The legislative
history of § 881 confirms the punitive nature of these provisions."107
By declaring the entirety of section 881 punitive, the Court did not

101. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220 (9th Cir. 1994),
amended on denial of reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346).
102. See, e.g., Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300; Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 276-79, 906 P.2d at 934-36.
103. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573-74 (1994).
104. Id. at 300.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)). In so holding, the
Tilley court ignored not only Austin but its own precedent. In Wood v. United States, the same
fifth circuit panel that decided Tilley reviewed the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and
recognized the punitive nature of proceeds forfeitures by holding that such forfeitures "cannot
seriously be considered anything other than an economic penalty for drug trafficking." 863 F.2d
417, 421 (5th Cir. 1989). Tilley totally ignores the holding of Wood.
Furthermore, Tilley's bank-robbery-proceeds analogy fails because the purpose of seizing
funds stolen in a robbery is to return them to the robbery victim, not to punish the robber. If
such funds were seized from a bank robber pursuant to a statute motivated by an intent to punish
the robber rather than compensate the robbery victim, such a seizure would be punitive.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 50-67.
107. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
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draw a distinction between facilitation and proceeds forfeitures.'08
Thus, "there is no doubt that the forfeiture of property in a judicial
forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) constitutes punishment."'

09

Even if forfeiture of narcotics distribution proceeds "merely places
that party in the lawfully protected financial status quo that he enjoyed
prior to launching his illegal scheme," 10 it is nonetheless punitive
because the purpose of the forfeiture statute is not solely remedial."'
Although the forfeiture of proceeds may indeed be partially remedial,
[I]f a particular remedial sanction can only be understood as also
serving punitive goals, then the person subjected to the sanction has
been punished despite that fact that the sanction is also remedial.
To conclude otherwise effectively invalidates the Double Jeopardy
Clause by allowing multiple punishments for the same conduct
merely because the punishment also serves remedial purposes." 2
Thus, to avoid running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
government must forego forfeiture of narcotics proceeds, forego
criminal prosecution, or pursue both remedies in the same proceeding.
Indeed, the government's refusal to pursue forfeiture as part of a
criminal indictment is a frustrating aspect of the recent forfeituredouble jeopardy litigation. Of course, if the government seeks
forfeiture of drug-related property as part of a criminal proceeding, the
defendant will have an attorney, and the government will have the
burden of proof. Avoiding the myriad protections afforded a criminal
defendant provides strong motivation for the government to seek civil
rather than criminal forfeiture, despite the double jeopardy issues
engendered by such an approach.
Perhaps an even more important motivation for the government
to seek civil rather than criminal forfeiture is the desire to attack the
defendant on two separate fronts. This motivation is clear in that the
government commonly uses the forfeiture of property as a plea

108. Contra$288,930.00 in U.S. Currency, 838 F. Supp. at 370 (suggesting that Austin was
limited to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (aX7)).
109. United States v. Nakamoto, 876 F. Supp. 235, 237 (D. Haw.), affd, 67 F.3d 310 (9th
Cir. 1995) petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 95-7313); see also $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d at 1220 (rejecting the argument that the forfeiture of proceeds is not punitive
because such an argument "fails to recognize the legal standard that Austin established"); Wood,
863 F.2d at 421 (recognizing that proceeds forfeitures are punitive because they were designed
"to augment 'the traditional criminal sanctions of fines and imprisonment"').
110. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 50-67.
112. United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994).
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bargaining tool in the criminal case. Even if the government's criminal
case is flawed or weak, a defendant may be willing to plead guilty to
save his home or significant property. Thus, it is understandable that
the government would rather wade into the double jeopardy quagmire
than surrender its civil forfeiture weapon. As it becomes more clear
that civil forfeiture violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when pursued
in a separate proceeding to punish drug crimes, the government will
likely recognize that criminal forfeiture, which is constitutionally
acceptable, is a preferable procedure.
3. Disproportionality Analysis
Another disturbing trend followed by some courts, in their
reluctance to give full force and effect to the Halper-Austin-Kurth
Ranch rule, is to deny double jeopardy claims where the government
can show that the amount of the forfeiture was roughly proportionate
to the expense of detecting and prosecuting the crime. A good
example of this "proportionality" analysis is Johnson v. State,"3 in
which the court, after recognizing that the statute at issue did not serve
a solely remedial purpose, applied proportionality analysis to determine
whether prosecution for the charged offenses would violate double
jeopardy." 4 According to the Johnson court, this analysis looks at
"whether the forfeiture amount approximates the cost of investigating,
apprehending, and prosecuting the defendant, or whether the forfeiture
relates otherwise to any actual damages that the defendant caused the
state."115 The Johnson court was mistaken in applying this proportionality analysis. The court's conclusion that the statute was partially
punitive should have ended the inquiry.
Any argument that drug-related forfeiture is remedial, to the
extent that it serves to reimburse the government for its actual costs,
must be rejected. Under the Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch rule, the
legislative intent behind the statute, rather than its effect, controls the
punitive nature of the statute." 6 As discussed above, the Court in
Austin declared that forfeiture provisions, like the one at issue in

113. 882 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
114. Id. at 20; see also Borromeo, 1 F.3d at 221 ("In the wake of Austin, an inquiry into the
proportionality between the value of the instrumentality sought to be forfeited and the amount
needed to effectuate the legitimate remedial purposes of the forfeiture would seem to be in
order.").
115. 882 S.W.2d at 20.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
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Johnson, 17 are punitive; thus, regardless of the individual case facts,
the imposition of such a forfeiture sanction is punishment.
Moreover, any argument that a forfeiture is remedial in a
particular case should be rejected because any relationship between the
value of property forfeited and the actual damages is both speculative
and coincidental. As the Austin court noted, "the dramatic variations
in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) undercut [the argument that those provisions
provide a reasonable form of liquidated damages]" 1 8 because the
value of the property forfeitable "can vary so dramatically that any
relationship between the Government's actual costs and the amount of
the sanction is merely coincidental."' 1 9 Thus, in the forfeiture arena,
the Supreme Court has rejected a case-by-case approach to the
question of whether proceeds-forfeiture provisions are punitive.
Finally, a rule that a forfeiture is remedial if it reimburses the
government for its costs is unworkable and unfair. Such a rule is
unworkable because it is extremely difficult to assess the government's
costs in a particular case. Are the government's costs limited to the
hours spent by detectives investigating the case? Or do the costs
include the salary of jail workers, drug lab technicians, prosecutors,
public defenders, and others? For what length of time may the
government legitimately charge its expenses? Can the police extend an
investigation over a period of weeks, months, or years in order to
increase the amount of the reimbursement they can eventually seek
from the defendant? Can the police justify as costs the use of
expensive investigative methods such as aerial surveillance and use
those costs to justify the amount of a forfeiture? Such questions are
difficult, if not impossible, to answer. In addition, they show that
allowing forfeiture to reimburse the government for its costs would be
subject to abuse. Indeed, the government could probably justify any
forfeiture, no matter how large, by expanding the web of costs.
Allowing forfeiture to the extent that it reimburses the government would also be unfair. Assume the government can demonstrate
that investigation and prosecution of a particular case cost $10,000. To
some defendants, $10,000 may be a trifling sum, while to others it may

117. The Texas forfeiture statute at issue in Johnson, TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
59, like the federal forfeiture statute at issue in Austin, 21 U.S.C. § 881, has several punitive
characteristics. For example, forfeiture is tied to the commission of a crime, see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.01(2)-59.02(a) (West Supp. 1996), and a defense is provided for the
"innocent owner." See id. art 59.02(c).
118. 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
119. Id. at 2812 n.14.
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represent a life savings. Such disproportionate punishment for the
same offense is unfair. In sum, the argument that a forfeiture
provision is remedial to the extent that it serves to reimburse the
government for its costs and damages must be rejected.
B.

Are Criminal Prosecution and Forfeiture of Crime-Related
Property Based on the "Same Offense"?

"In order to prevail in a double jeopardy challenge, a defendant
The
must not only show the existence of two 'punishments'.
defendant must also affirmatively establish he or she has been punished
twice for the same offense."' 12 Most courts have taken one of two
Under the first
approaches in resolving the same offense issue.'
approach, parallel criminal prosecution and civil in rem forfeiture are
conclusively based on the same offense when they are based on the
same violation of the same statute."' Under the second approach,
parallel criminal prosecution and civil in rem forfeiture are based on the
same offense if neither offense contains an element not contained in the
commonly known as the Dixonother.'23 This second approach is
124
Blockburger "same elements" test.
The following two sections will compare and analyze these
approaches. Whichever test is applied, it is clear that punishing an
individual for committing a drug offense, and then forfeiting her
property because it was involved in that very same drug offense,
constitutes the imposition of two punishments for the same offense.
1.

The "Same Violation of the Same Statute" Approach

Where parallel criminal prosecution and civil in rem forfeiture are
based on the same violation of the same statute, many courts have
foregone elaborate analysis and reached the obvious conclusion that the

120. State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 101, 875 P.2d 613, 618 (1994) (employing federal
double jeopardy analysis).
121. Alternatively, in Clark, the Washington Supreme Court did not adopt either approach.
124 Wash. 2d at 101-02, 875 P.2d at 618. Instead, the court stated that it was the defendants'
burden to establish that they were punished twice for the same offense and held that they failed
to do so. Id. at 101, 875 P.2d at 618. This approach is frustrating because it provides little
guidance. It also demonstrates the court's reluctance to grapple with an issue which, when
properly resolved, requires dismissal of a criminal conviction.
122. See infra part III.B.1.
123. See infra part III.B.2.
124. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932).
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two punishments are based on the same offense. 2 ' Thus, in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, the Court declared,
without much analysis, that the tax on the illegally possessed marijuana
was based on the same offense as the underlying possession of
marijuana."'
In United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,127 the Ninth
Circuit took a similarly straightforward and conceptually honest
approach to the problem. In that case, the Government instituted a
civil forfeiture action five days after the grand jury issued an indictment charging the claimants with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, conspiracy to launder money, and money laundering.128
The forfeiture complaint listed over half of a million dollars, a
129
helicopter, an airplane, two boats, and eleven automobiles.
According to the Government, "the property was forfeitable on two
independent grounds: as proceeds of illegal narcotics transactions
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), and as property 'involved in' money
laundering violations under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)."' 3 °
The
district court held that the Government had established probable cause
under both theories, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Government. 131 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the forfeiture
action was based on the same offense as the criminal convictions and
stated,
There can be little doubt that this case implicates the core Double
Jeopardy protection. Over a year after the claimants' criminal
convictions, a different district judge in a different proceeding
awarded the government title to nearly all of the claimants' property,
because of its connection with the very offenses that resulted in
criminal punishment. The forfeiture complaint in this case was
based on precisely the same conduct addressed in the claimants'
criminal case, and it sought to forfeit title to the claimants' property
on the basis of precisely the same violations of the same statutes.
In short, this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal

125. See, e.g., Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 824 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United
States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
126. See 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
127. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995),
and cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346).
128. Id. at 1214.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1214-15.
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prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical
laws. 132

Clearly, Kurth Ranch and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency indicate that
where two punishments are imposed for the same violation of the same
statute, both punishments are imposed for the same offense. Adopting
this approach, the court in United States v. Barton133 stated, quite
simply, that "once convicted in a criminal case, a defendant cannot
subsequently be punished
in a civil forfeiture action based on the same
134
violations of law."'
In sum, although not all forfeitures are based on the same
13
violation of the same statute that was at issue in the criminal case, 1
the same violation of the same statute approach is appealing and
sensible. Where the forfeiture complaint and the criminal indictment
are based on the same acts-the same crime occurring at the same
time-it makes sense to say that both actions involve the same offense.
2.

The Dixon-Blockburger Test

Despite the simplicity of the first approach, some courts have held
that resolution of the same offense question requires application of the
Dixon-Blockburger "same elements" test.'3 6 This test asks "whether

132. Id. at 1215-16; see also United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 527 (D. Or. 1995).
133. 46 F.3d 51 (9th Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 52; see also United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency, 769 F.2d 583,
588 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "criminal conviction and the property involved in this civil
forfeiture proceeding are integrally related parts of the same unlawful drug dealing scheme"), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 971
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (noting that the criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture were "based on the exact
same facts"); McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1303 (stating that there is "no doubt that McCaslin was
subjected to the forfeiture of his residential property, and then to criminal sanctions, as
punishments for the same offense"); Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. 1994) (concluding
that "appellant has already been punished for his criminal conduct by the forfeiture of his
property, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United Sates Constitution prohibits further
punishment by the State for the same incident"); Ex parte Tomlinson, 886 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994) (declining to engage in Dixon-Blockburger analysis to determine whether two
punishments were imposed for the same offense).
135. See Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359, 362 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
that failure to report is a different offense from making false statements); Crowder v. United
States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 703 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that forfeiture was based on money
laundering while criminal prosecution was based on actual distribution of marijuana).
136. See Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. at 525 (introducing Dixon-Blockburger test to determine
whether prosecution of two statutory crimes offends double jeopardy); United States v. Shorb, 876
F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (D. Or.) (holding that prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute and money laundering were not based on the same offense as the forfeiture because
each conviction "required proof of discrete, substantive elements not at issue in the civil forfeiture
cases... [and] the forfeiture cases required a showing that the... properties were implicated in
defendant's misconduct, an element not at issue in the criminal cases"), afJ'd in part, vacated in

1996]

Forfeiture of Crime-Related Property

each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not,
they are the 'same offense' and double jeopardy bars additional
punishment and successive prosecution."''
Even if the Dixon-B lockburger same elements test is the appropriate test, civil forfeiture and criminal conviction based on the same
illegal conduct are the same offense because the forfeiture statutes
contain all the elements of the underlying criminal statutes they

incorporate.

For example, the federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, is

triggered by the commission of a crime,13 and it incorporates large
portions of the federal Controlled Substances Act.'39 Similarly, in
Washington State, the property sought to be forfeited under WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.50.505 must be "traced to a violation" of Title 69.50,
Washington's version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 40
Where a statute incorporates another statute in this manner, the two
statutes satisfy the same elements test and constitute the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes.' 4
In United States v. Dixon, 14 the Court addressed the question
of whether a defendant could be punished for violation of a court order
and also be punished for the act constituting the violation of that
order. 143 The Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he "crime" of violating a condition of release cannot be abstracted from the "element" of the violated condition. The Dixon court
order incorporated the entire governing criminal code in the same
manner as the Harrisfelony-murder statute incorporated the several
enumerated felonies. Here, as in Harris,the underlying substantive
'1 44
criminal offense is "a species of lesser-included offense.'
Because the court order incorporated the entire criminal code, violation
of both the order and the substantive statute constituted the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes.
Crime-related forfeiture statutes generally incorporate the
underlying drug offense in much the same way as the court order in
Dixon incorporated the entire criminal code. 14 ' The federal forfeiture

part. 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1995), and petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996) (No. 95-7949).
137. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856.
138. See 21 U.S.C.A. §8 8 1(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
139. See id.
140. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(a) (1994).
141. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
142. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
143. Id. at 2853.
144. Id. at 2857.
145. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
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statute specifies that in order to forfeit property, the government must
prove that the property was involved in the commission of a crime.'46
In specifying which crimes may result in forfeiture, the forfeiture
statute incorporates the entire subchapter of the code dealing with
narcotics offenses. 147 Thus, even under the Dixon-Blockburger same
elements test, civil forfeiture under section 881(a) and criminal
constitute the "same offense"
prosecution under the same subchapter
148
as defined by Dixon-Blockburger.
In Oakes v. United States,149 the court rejected the Government's
argument that the applicable forfeiture provision (21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7)) and the applicable controlled substance provision (21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) possess separate elements.150 The court recognized that "[s]ection 881(a)(7) is premised upon a violation of Title 21
In other words, "[a]ny forfeiture under section
section 801 et seq."''
881(a)(7)... requires a preceding violation of the controlled substance
statutes."'5 2 Thus, the court found the Government's argument to
be completely untenable: "To accept the Government's argument that
the sections involve different elements simply because one section of
the statute deals with property and the other people, would be to adopt
a circular and illusory theory."' 3
Another way of looking at the same offense issue is to examine
whether the criminal statute has an element not contained in the
forfeiture statute. While the forfeiture statute will always have
elements not contained in the criminal statute, namely the involvement
of the property in the drug crime,' " the criminal statute does not
contain any elements that are absent from the forfeiture statute because
the forfeiture statute incorporates the criminal statute in its entirety.
Courts holding to the contrary demonstrate their reluctance to
enforce constitutional guarantees where doing so would require
reversing a criminal conviction. For example, in United States v.

146. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
147. See id.
148. See Oakes, 872 F. Supp. at 824; see also United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); McCaslin,
863 F. Supp. at 1303.
149. 872 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
150. Id. at 824.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. E.g., Shorb, 876 F. Supp. at 1188 (recognizing that "the forfeiture cases required a
showing that the... properties were implicated in the defendant's misconduct, an element not
at issue in the criminal cases").
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Shorb,"' the court applied the Dixon-Blockburger test "in a strict
fashion" to conclude that the defendants' criminal "convictions
required proof of discrete, substantive elements not at issue in the civil
forfeiture cases.' 1 56 As a result, the court found no double jeopardy
violation.' 57 Perhaps recognizing the flaw in its argument that it
could not specify the "discrete substantive elements" that were not at
issue in the forfeiture case, the court proceeded to state that
[o]f course, . . . defendant could prevail on the double jeopardy

issue at the appellate level. After all, there is no question that the
...

forfeitures were based generally on the same conduct addressed

in the criminal cases. Under the circumstances, a Ninth Circuit
panel might take the view that the first forfeiture and the criminal
conviction constituted multiple punishments for the same offense.'58

Apparently, the Shorb court could not entirely ignore the Ninth Circuit
holding in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, which compels the opposite
conclusion.5 9 Indeed, in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the Government sought forfeiture of the defendant's property "because of its
connection with the very offenses that resulted in criminal punishment."' 60 Therefore, the court had little doubt that the core double
jeopardy protection was at issue. 6'
Whether applying the common-sense same violation of the same
statute approach or the Dixon-Blockburger same elements test, a fair
reading of Supreme Court precedent commands that the forfeiture of
property related to a criminal act and prosecution for that criminal act

155. 876 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Or. 1995), affd in part, vacated in part, 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir.
1995), and petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996) (No. 95-7949).
156. Id. at 1188.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. The court in $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency found a violation of double jeopardy where the Government obtained convictions in the
criminal case and then continued to pursue a forfeiture action. Id. at 1214, 1222. In addressing
the "same offense" issue, the court recognized:
The forfeiture complaint... was based on precisely the same conduct addressed in the
claimants' criminal case, and it sought to forfeit title to the claimants' property on the
basis of precisely the same violations of the same statutes. In short, this civil forfeiture
action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the
identical laws; the only difference between the two proceedings was the remedy sought
by the government.
Id. at 1216.
160. Id. at 1216.
161. Id.
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constitute two punishments for the same offense for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.
C.

Were the Two Punishments Imposed in "Separate Proceedings"?

The imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause only if the punishments are
imposed in separate proceedings.1 62 Yet, some courts have avoided
finding a double jeopardy violation by holding that the civil forfeiture
of property used to commit a drug offense and the parallel criminal
prosecution for that drug offense constitute a "single, coordinated
prosecution" and therefore a single proceeding.' 63 For example, in
United States v. Millan,16 the court found a single, coordinated
prosecution because both the criminal charges and the forfeiture action
"were issued as part of a coordinated effort to put an end to an
extensive narcotics conspiracy."''
The court in United States v.
18775 North Bay Road'66 reached a similar result.167 However,
because Millan and 18775 North Bay Road were decided before Kurth
Ranch, serious doubt is cast upon their continuing validity on this
point.

168

Millan and other courts that have adopted the single, coordinated
prosecution approach rely on the fact that the forfeiture actions and
criminal prosecutions took place at approximately the same time and
involved the same criminal violations. 169 However, this approach
"contradicts controlling Supreme Court precedent as well as common
sense. "170 In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, the
tax was imposed as an important part of a broad state effort to deter
illegal narcotics distribution. 17 1 If this tax was not part of a single,

162. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994),
amended on denial of reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); see also supra note 22.
163. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Milan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); United
States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 972 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
164. 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
165. Id. at 20.
166. 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
167. Id. at 1499 (finding that "the circumstances of the simultaneous pursuit by the
government of criminal and civil sanctions... falls within the contours of a single, coordinated
prosecution").
168. People v. Towns, 646 N.E.2d 1366, 1372 (InI. App. Ct. 1995); see also United States
v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
169. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20; see also 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. at 972.
170. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216.
171. See 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994).
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coordinated prosecution, it is difficult to see how a civil forfeiture
action can be considered a part of a parallel criminal prosecution.
The single, coordinated prosecution argument is another example
of how courts have extended a legal fiction and stretched logic to avoid
granting relief to a defendant twice punished. At least on the federal
level, the Legislature has established a method for seeking both
forfeiture and criminal punishment in a single coordinated prosecution:
the government can add a forfeiture charge to the indictment and seek
criminal forfeiture of drug-related property.'72 If the government
pursues criminal forfeiture, the matters are heard at the same time, by
the same fact-finder, under the same cause number. This is a single,
coordinated prosecution. Where the government seeks civil forfeiture,
actions are filed at different times, under different cause numbers, and
are resolved before different finders of fact. To say that this is a
single, coordinated prosecution because both the civil forfeiture and the
criminal prosecution are part of the government's effort to deter and
punish illegal activity is absurd.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, "two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, instituted
at different times, tried at different times, before different factfinders,
presided over by different district judges, and resolved by separate
judgments," simply do not constitute the same proceeding.' 73 While
such actions could correctly be characterized as "parallel proceedings,"
they are not the same proceeding as required under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' 74 Rather, "[a] forfeiture case and a criminal
prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only if they were
brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time." '7 The
Ninth Circuit, unlike the Second Circuit in Millan and the Eleventh
Circuit in 18755 North Bay Road, was unwilling "to whitewash the

172. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216 (recognizing that the government "could
have included a criminal forfeiture count in the indictment which led to the claimants'
convictions").
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Or. 1994)
("Applying the $405,089.23 decision to the undisputed facts of this case, it is dear that the
criminal case against Stanwood and the civil forfeiture cases involving his property constituted
separate proceeding for double jeopardy purposes."); United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp.
1299, 1304 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (recognizing that "a civil action aimed at exacting a penalty, and
a criminal prosecution directed to the same offense, even when filed dose in time, constitute two
proceedings when pursued in separate cases and concluded at different times").
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double jeopardy violation ... by affording constitutional significance
to the label of 'single, coordinated prosecution."" 76
In reaching their conclusions that the civil forfeiture actions and
criminal prosecutions that were at issue constituted a single, coordinated prosecution, the Millan and 18755 North Bay Road courts "also
relied upon the absence of any showing 'that the government acted
abusively by seeking a second punishment because of dissatisfaction
with the punishment levied in the first action.' 1 7 7 The problem
with this reliance is fundamental: "[T]he prosecutor's state of mind
cannot determine whether a defendant has been placed twice in
jeopardy. In a jury case, for example, jeopardy attaches when the jury
is sworn-before the prosecutor has occasion to feel 'dissatisfaction'
Thus, if the statutes that the government
with the sentence.""17
relies upon are "punitive," the target of those statutes has been
punished regardless of whether the prosecuting authority acted
vindictively.
In United States v. Torres,'79 the Seventh Circuit also rejected
the notion that a criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture were part of
a single, coordinated prosecution merely because they were instituted
at the same time.8 0 The court noted that
[c]ivil and criminal proceedings are not only docketed separately but
also tried separately, and under the double jeopardy clause separate
trials are anathema . . . . Separate administrative and criminal
proceedings can lead to two trials, each of which produces a punishment for a single offense. Two trials, even if close in time, are still
double jeopardy. This would be clear enough if the United States
put Torres on trial, convicted him of attempting to buy the cocaine,
and sentenced him to 37 months' imprisonment, then the next day
held a second trial for the same offense and tacked on another 36
months, for a total of 73. Although 73 months would have been a
lawful punishment after a single trial, Torres would have had an
invulnerable defense of former jeopardy at trial No. 2.18"

176. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217; see also Oakes v. United States, 827 F.
Supp. 817, 825 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that "this court, like the Ninth Circuit, is unwilling
to whitewash a potential double jeopardy violation").
177. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting United States v. 18755 N. Ray Rd., 13 F.3d
1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994)).
178. Id.
179. 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
180. Id. at 1465.
181. Id.
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The reasoning of Torres on this point is compelling, especially when
compared with the simplistic approach adopted by the Second Circuit
in Millan and the Eleventh Circuit in 18755 North Bay Road. Indeed,
in a recent federal case brought in the District of Hawaii, United States
v. Nakamoto,182 the Government conceded that the forfeiture action
was a separate proceeding from the criminal prosecution," 3 which
perhaps indicates that the government has abandoned the single,
coordinated prosecution argument, at least in the Ninth Circuit.
IV. SETTLEMENT, PLEA, AND WAIVER
In a further attempt to whitewash the protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the lower federal courts and some state appellate
courts have adopted several ways to avoid following the Halper-AustinKurth Ranch rule, recognizing that to follow the rule would require
dismissal of a judgment against a convicted drug offender. This
section will discuss some of the theories that courts have applied to
avoid the clear conclusion that the government may not impose both
civil forfeiture and criminal conviction for the same offense. These
theories include the following: (1) a person who fails to file a claim to
seized property thereby waives any subsequent double jeopardy claim;
(2) a person who reaches a settlement with the government in the
forfeiture action thereby waives any subsequent double jeopardy claim;
and (3) a defendant who pleads guilty in the criminal case thereby
waives any subsequent double jeopardy claim. As explained below,
each of the preceding theories must be rejected.
A.

Failure to File a Claim

One of the most popular ways to avoid the Halper-Austin-Kurth
Ranch rule is to assert that an individual who failed to file a claim to
seized property thereby waived any double jeopardy claim." 4 While
182. 876 F. Supp. 235 (D. Haw.), affd, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995), petitionfor cert. filed,
(U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 95-7313).
183. Id. at 236.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

"an owner who receives notice of the intended forfeiture and fails to claim... the property has
effectively abandoned it... [and] the forfeiture of abandoned property cannot be said to implicate
the former owner's double jeopardy rights"), petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 13, 1996) (No. 957955); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.) (holding that a defendant who did
not make claim in civil forfeiture did not become a party to the forfeiture proceeding and was
therefore not placed in jeopardy), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United States v. Sherrett,
877 F. Supp. 519, 524 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that it was the defendant's burden to show a
double jeopardy violation, and the defendant failed to establish prior jeopardy in proceeds
forfeiture because he failed to file a claim); United States v. Chaney, 882 F. Supp. 829, 830 (E.D.
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this holding provides an analytically clean method to resolve certain
cases in the government's favor, its premise is faulty. In United States
8 the court admitted that the "failure to claim constiv. Nakamoto,"'
tutes waiver" holding was motivated by the desire to reach a result
favoring the Government rather than by sound legal reasoning:
It is clear that the line must be drawn before extending double
jeopardy protection to an uncontested administrative forfeiture. To
do otherwise would invalidate the use of administrative forfeiture
per se . . . . Neither the Ninth Circuit in $405,089.23, nor the
Austin, and Kurth Ranch could have
Supreme Court in Halper,
86
intended such a result.1
The result-oriented nature of the court's reasoning is evident from this
passage. The court all but admits that it has engaged in "linedrawing" rather than sound legal reasoning by basing its ruling on the
belief that the Supreme Court could not possibly have intended to
invalidate the use of administrative forfeiture. Contrary to the
reasoning of the Nakamoto court, the Supreme Court precedents should
perhaps be understood to mean that preservation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy is more important than maintaining the government's unfettered ability to pursue administrative
forfeiture.
Accepting, as we must, that forfeiture is punitive, it seems clear
that the punishment consists of the loss of the property. Thus, where
the defendant fails to file a claim to the property and thereby loses all
title to it, he has nonetheless been punished because he has been
deprived of his property pursuant to a punitive statute. As the Tenth
Circuit noted, in a slightly different context, in United States v.

Wis. 1995) (holding that because defendant failed to file a claim to forfeited property, he was not
placed in jeopardy in the constitutional sense); United States v. Nakamoto, 876 F. Supp. 235, 23637 (D.Haw.) (holding that a defendant who did not contest civil forfeiture was never placed in
jeopardy), affd, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 957313); United States v. Walsh, 873 F. Supp. 334, 337 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that the defendant
was "not placed in jeopardy" because he did not file a claim or respond to notice of seizure and
intended forfeiture and, thus, forfeiture of his property did not violate his personal constitutional
rights even though he avowed ownership of the property during the narcotics prosecution); United
States v. Branum, 872 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that jeopardy did not attach
where defendant failed to file a claim to seized property); Crowder v. United States, 874 F. Supp.
700, 703-04 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that defendant failed to establish jeopardy because he
failed to file a claim); United States v. Kemmish, 869 F. Supp. 803, 805 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding
that where a person from whom currency was seized did not claim property, he was not placed
in jeopardy).
185. 876 F. Supp. 235 (D. Haw.), affd, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Dec. 26, 1995) (No. 95-7313).
186. Id. at 238.
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Hudson: 87 "[I]f a particular remedial sanction can only be understood as also serving punitive goals, then the person subjected to the
sanction has been punished."'8 8
Imagine the absurdity of an argument that a defendant in a
criminal prosecution was not punished because he did not contest his
guilt. The incarceration that follows an uncontested criminal prosecution is no less punishment because the defendant did not raise a
defense."8 9 Similarly, the loss of property that follows an uncontested
forfeiture is still punishment even if the defendant failed to file a claim
to the seized property. 9 '
A different situation might be presented if there was real doubt as
to whether the property belonged to the claimant prior to its seizure.
However, in most cases, this is not an issue because the ownership of
the seized property is readily discernible. Bank accounts, real property,
and vehicles are all titled and registered. The ownership of these items
will be apparent.'
Moreover, in order to prevail in the forfeiture
action, the government must trace the property to a drug offense,
usually a drug offense committed by the person from whom the
property was seized.' 92 In such situations, although the defendant
may not have proved ownership, he has demonstrated a possessory
interest in the forfeited property that should entitle him to double
jeopardy protection.
Moreover, requiring a defendant to file a claim to seized property
to preserve any future double jeopardy claim would adversely impact
the defendant's right to remain silent. In Wohlstrom v. Buchanan,"'
the court recognized the self-incrimination danger in forcing a
defendant to file a claim to seized property or risk forfeiture:

187. 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 540.
189. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
uncontested forfeiture action is like a guilty plea in a criminal case), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346).
190. See Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 827-29 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that
the defendant, who did not answer or contest the forfeiture complaint, was nonetheless punished
by the forfeiture).
191. See, e.g., Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. at 521 (holding that the defendant failed to file a claim,
while recognizing that the property in question was "his residence").
192. See, e.g., Torres, 28 F.3d at 1464-65 (stating that there was "no reason to believe that
[Torres] owned or had any interest in the money," even though the $60,000 forfeited to the
Government was seized from Torres' person).
193. 884 P.2d 687 (Ariz. 1994).
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Here, by invoking his right against self-incrimination, petitioner lost
the ability to intervene in the proceedings, virtually assuring a
forfeiture ....

[T]he trial court impermissibly forced petitioner to choose
between "surrendering his constitutional privilege and forfeiting
property." Putting one in such a quandary takes away the freedom
to invoke the privilege without repercussions and abrogates any
opportunity to make meaningful decisions.19
Finally, requiring a defendant to assert a claim to the seized
property in the absence of his good faith belief that he is entitled to
prevail in the forfeiture proceeding would arguably violate Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it would require the defendant
to file a frivolous claim.19 Requiring a defendant to file a frivolous
claim to seized property in order to preserve his constitutional right to
be free from double jeopardy is clearly too burdensome and, thus,
cannot be correct. Forfeiture constitutes punishment even if the
defendant fails to file a claim to the seized property."
B.

Settlement of the Forfeiture Proceeding

Just as some courts have found no double jeopardy violation
where no claim to the property was filed, other courts have held that
there is no double jeopardy where the defendant negotiates a settlement
of the forfeiture action with the government and the case does not
proceed to hearing.197 This settlement-waiver theory is erroneous
because jeopardy attaches when a defendant loses his right to property,
whether by settlement or judgment, and waiver of any constitutional

194. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted). Contra Cretacci, 62 F.3d at 311 (stating that "a
defendant does not risk incriminating himself by daiming that he owns property that is subject
to forfeiture").
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (1995) states in part:
By presenting to the court ... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief. .. it is not being presented for any improper purpose, ....
[and) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing
law.
196. See Oakes 872 F. Supp. at 827-29 (stating that an uncontested administrative forfeiture
constitutes prior punishment).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 524-25 (D. Or. 1995) (holding
that the defendant failed to establish prior jeopardy where forfeiture proceeding was resolved by
agreement of the parties without entry of final judgment of forfeiture); In re 2120 S. 4th Ave., 870
P.2d 417, 421 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that because defendant conceded that his interest
in the property was forfeitable, he has no double jeopardy claim).
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right is invalid unless made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.19s

In United States v. Ursery,9 9 the court explained that settlement
by a consent judgment does not preclude a double jeopardy analysis. 0 0 The consent judgment in the Ursery forfeiture proceeding was
an adjudication for double jeopardy purposes because jeopardy attached
when the judgment of forfeiture was entered against the defendant.2 0'
In other words, the defendant was punished and jeopardy attached
when he lost his rights to the property. The fact that this result was
achieved in a consent judgment was irrelevant.
In United States v. Hudson,0 2 the court reminded us that a valid
waiver of constitutional rights, including double jeopardy, must be a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.20 3 Thus, waiver of a
double jeopardy claim cannot be implied from a consent judgment that
does not clearly indicate such a waiver. The Hudson court noted that
the government must obtain an express waiver in a consent judgment
situation: "If it was the Government's intent to have Appellants waive
certain rights, the Government would have phrased the Waiver
Provision in terms which clearly stated that Appellants were abandoning those rights so that they could have made a voluntary, intelligent
' 4
and knowing waiver. 2
The Ursery and Hudson courts have properly rejected the
government's argument that settlement of the forfeiture action
constitutes waiver of any double jeopardy claim. The constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy, which is on par with other
constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel and the right to trial
by jury, cannot be lightly waived. Courts should require that waiver
of double jeopardy rights, like waiver of any constitutional right, be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
If the parties negotiate a
settlement requiring the defendant to waive any subsequent double
jeopardy claim, a waiver provision should be included in the settlement
agreement. If the settlement agreement does not contain such a
waiver, a waiver should not be implied.
198. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536,
539 (10th Cir. 1994).
199. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No.
95-345, 95-346).
200. Id. at 571.
201. Id.
202. 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994).
203. Id. at 539.
204. Id.
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C. Guilty Plea as Waiver of Double Jeopardy Claim
A corollary to the argument that a defendant waives a double
jeopardy claim by entering into a settlement agreement with the
government is the argument that the defendant waives a double
jeopardy claim by pleading guilty in the criminal case. Although the
government could require an explicit waiver of a double jeopardy claim
as part of a plea negotiation, if the plea statement is silent as to double
jeopardy, such a waiver should not be implied. Just as it is inappropriate to imply a waiver of a constitutional right following settlement, it
is improper to imply a waiver of a constitutional right merely because
the defendant pleaded guilty in the criminal case.
In Oakes v. United States,2 °s the Government argued that the
defendant waived any double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty to the
criminal charge."' Rejecting this argument, the court stated,
Mr. Oakes brings his challenge based solely on the face of the
indictment and record in the civil and criminal actions. He does not
seek an evidentiary hearing nor is one required. The court,
therefore, rejects the Government's argument that Mr. Oakes
waived his double jeopardy claim when he pleaded guilty." 7
In contrast, in United States v. Barton,20 8 the court rejected the
defendant's double jeopardy claim when he entered into a settlement
agreement in a civil forfeiture action after pleading guilty to the related
criminal violation. 20 9 The court stated,
He was indicted, agreed to plead guilty and was sentenced to
imprisonment before the civil proceedings against the real estate and
currency were completed .... Because Barton had already pleaded
guilty to the criminal charges, that criminal conviction is not now
subject to a double jeopardy attack by virtue of the subsequent civil
proceedings.21
Although this case might support the notion that entry of a guilty plea
waives any subsequent double jeopardy challenge, it is more appropriately viewed as holding that a criminal conviction cannot be challenged
on double jeopardy grounds when it preceded the entry of the forfeiture
order. As mentioned earlier, it is the second punishment that is barred
205. 872 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
206. Id. at 820.
207. Id. at 823.
208. 46 F.3d 51 (9th Cir. 1995).
209. Id. at 51-52.
210. Id. at 52.
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by the double jeopardy clause, whether that be the criminal prosecution
or the forfeiture proceeding.21 ' Other courts have rejected the notion
that a guilty plea waives a subsequent double jeopardy claim.2 12
V. REMEDY
It may seem obvious that the remedy for a double jeopardy
violation is dismissal or reversal of the second punishment. For
example, if a defendant forfeits property to the government and then
is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the prison term must be
vacated. Similarly, if the defendant is criminally punished and then
the government is awarded title to his property, the property should be
returned.
Nonetheless, at least one writer has suggested that where the
criminal prosecution is the subsequent punishment, the proper remedy
is not dismissal of the criminal charges, but merely vacation of the
sentence:
The double jeopardy provision . . . does not bar the government
from prosecuting (as opposed to punishing) the defendant, and a
trial court should deny a motion to dismiss the charges against the
defendant on double jeopardy grounds and allow the criminal action
to proceed. If the criminal prosecution results in a verdict or
finding of not guilty, no double jeopardy problem arises: the
defendant was subjected to only one criminal trial for her conduct;
she was not prosecuted a second time for the same offense after an
acquittal, after a conviction, or even after the premature termination
of a criminal trial; and she was not punished twice for the same
offense.
On the other hand, if the government succeeds in its criminal
prosecution of the defendant, the Double Jeopardy Clause, as
interpreted in Halper, dearly bars the imposition of any punishment
upon the defendant . . . . Nevertheless, this result-despite its
shortcomings-will in most cases be preferable to having the charges
against the defendant dismissed before trial. Although the government will not be able to impose a term of incarceration or a fine
upon the defendant, it will have obtained a criminal conviction of
the defendant, as allowed by Halper, with all the collateral consequences such a conviction entails.213
211. See supra note 48.
212. See, e.g. United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 171 (1995); United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Or. 1994).
213. David S. Rudstein, Civil Penaltiesand Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 614-16 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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This contention that the government should proceed with prosecution
is erroneous for several reasons. First, the very motivations for such
a prosecution, according to Professor Rudstien, are "the collateral
consequences such a conviction entails. 21 4 These collateral consequences are punitive in themselves and therefore cannot be imposed in
a separate proceeding following a punitive forfeiture. Moreover, such
an approach ignores the realities of scarce judicial resources. Surely
there are too many legitimate targets to allow the government the
luxury of pursuing criminal convictions where punishment cannot
constitutionally be imposed. Where the forfeiture precedes the
2 13
criminal conviction, both sentence and conviction must be vacated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As various courts grapple with the forfeiture-double jeopardy
issue, divergent lines of authority emerge. Some courts, giving a fair
reading to the recent precedents, have overturned forfeiture judgments
and reversed and vacated convictions; other courts, unwilling to grant
such relief, have created artificial barriers to double jeopardy protection. Because the holdings of various circuits are impossible to
reconcile, ultimate resolution of the forfeiture-double jeopardy issue,
and all its sub-parts, awaits a final pronouncement by the Supreme
Court. Until then, defendants would do well to raise the issue in all
possible contexts. To avoid losing hard-fought judgments on appeal,
prosecutors should recognize that they will likely only get one shot at
each defendant for each offense; they should pursue all the punishment
they wish imposed in the same proceeding.
The Double Jeopardy Clause has always prohibited the government from imposing two punishments in separate proceedings for the
same offense. Over the last few years, it has become increasingly
apparent that taking a person's property as punishment for an offense
for which that person has already been criminally punished is a
punitive action, motivated by the goals of retribution and deterrence of
illegal activity. Although the courts have been reluctant to recognize
the constitutional infirmity in parallel civil forfeitures and criminal
prosecutions, it is now clear that where the government chooses to
ignore the double jeopardy problems engendered by this type of dual
assault on defendants in drug cases, it does so at its own peril, and it
risks losing the criminal conviction or the forfeited property. As this

214.
215.

See id. at 616.
See, e.g., Unites States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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area of the law continues to develop, no court, regardless of its desire
to rule against the defendant, will be able to avoid the conclusion that
the Double Jeopardy Clause simply will not permit double punishment
by civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution.

